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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CARL W. THORSTENSEN,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent_,
Case No.

vs.
SID WEESE,

Defendant and Appellant.

I

9899

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts set out in the Appellant's
brief and the facts stated in the Appellant's Disposition in Lower Court are inconsistent with the facts
stated in the record.
The record discloses that the Appellant and Respondent entered into a stock purchase agreement on
December 28, 1961, wherein the Respondent agreed
to sell to the Appellant 64 shares of stock in Ogden
3
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Utah Knitting Company at the agreed price of $50.00
per share and for a total sum of $3,200.00. The terms
of the agreement provided that $2,000.00 would be
paid to the Respondent at the time the agreement was
executed and the remaining $1,200.00 would be paid
at $100.00 per month beginning with January 31, 1962.
The Respondent received the $2,000.00 down payment
and the January and February, 1962, installments.
The Appellant refused to pay the remaining ten installments and the Respondent brought an action for
Breach of Contract and was awarded $1,000.00 for
damages by the Trial Court.
The Appellant and Respondent, at the time of
entering into the purchase agreement, were officers of
the Company. The Appellant was hired by the Company in February, 1956, as the Comptroller and later
he became the Secretary of the Company. In October
of 1961 he became the Manager of the Company;
throughout the entire period, he received a salary (Tr.
20, 24) . The Respondent was Vice President of the
Company and was inactive and was nothing more than
Vice President in name only (Tr. 5, Tr. 24).
In the latter part of January, 1962, it was determined by the Company's Accountant that the Corporation sustained an operating loss of $159,289.00 for the
year 1961, the loss was not determined in July, 1962
(Tr. 52). The accountant testified that during the
period of July, 1961 to January, 1962 there were certain factors indicating that the Corporation was in
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financial difficulty and may collapse. The accountant
testified that during this period there was a shortage
of cash and the management should have observed that
factor (Tr. 60). The Appellant during this period
was the Manager of the Company, and had control of
the books and was working with the books every day
('fr. 25). The accountant further testified that he
could have determined the approximate value of the
shares of stock in the Company in December of 1961
if a physical inventory would have been taken (Tr.
57).

The Appellant offered to purchase said shares of
stock at the price of $50.00 per share and the-Appellant
made his offer based upon his knowledge of the records
of the Corporation, being active in the Corporation
for over a five-year period and his being Secretary of
the Company (Tr. 33). The Appellant prior to entering into the agreement had knowledge that the L.D.S.
Church had been contacted concerning the sale of the
assets of the Company to the Church (Tr. 37). Contact
had been made with the Church up until February,
1962 and the Appellant stated in February, 1962 that
it looked like the Church was interested in taking over
the Company and it looked as if the share holders, after
paying all of the indebtedness, would come out with
the shares of stock in the Company worth $70.00 per
share. At the time the Appellant stated it looked as if
the Church would take over the assets of the Company,
the Appellant was not in default on the stock purchase
agreement (Tr. 63).
5
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STATEMENT OF POINT
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT
THAT THE STOCK ON OR ABOUT DECEMBER 28,1961, HAD VALUE, AND BOTH PARTIES WERE A_8SUMING THE RISK IN ENTERING INTO THE STOCK SALE, AND
THERE WAS NOT A MUTUAL MISTAKE
AS TO VALUE OF SAID STOCK.

ARGUMENT
Point

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT
THAT THE STOCK ON OR ABOUT DECEMBER 28,1961, HAD VALUE, AND BOTH PARTIES WERE ASSUMING THE RISK IN ENTERING INTO THE STOCK SALE, AND
THERE WAS NOT A MUTUAL MISTAKE
AS TO VALUE OF SAID STOCK.
The eight statements of facts outlined in support
of the Appellant's four points are inconsistent with the
facts as indica ted in the record.
The Appellant's second statement of fact that both
the Appellant and Respondent believed as a fact that
the stock had substantial value, is incorrect, in that the
Respondent testified he did not have knowledge of the

6
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value of the stock at the time of entering into the agreement; the Appellant offered the Respondent the sum
of $50.00 per share and the Respondent accepted that
offer (Tr. 7).
It is stated in 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 132:
"If parties to an agreement indicate an intention to be bound irrespective of the existence of
certain facts and to take the risk of their nonexistence, the validity of their agreement is not
at all dependent upon the existence of such facts.
On the other hand, if the parties indicate an intention not to be bound unless certain facts exist,
the nonexistence of such facts prevents any contractual duty, such facts being intended to operate, and operating, as a condition precedent to
obligation.
''Where the parties are conscious that the existence of particular facts is doubtful and make
their agreement on this assumption, the nonexistence of such facts does not affect the validity
of the agreement, the risk of their existence being taken by the party." Sears v. Grand Lodge,
A.O.U.W. 163 NY 374, 57 N.E. 618, 50 LRA.
204; Thiel v. Miller, 122 Wash. 52, 209 P. 1081,
26 A.L.R. 523.
In Corbin's Hornbook on Contracts in Section
605, he discusses what is market value and what establishes market value and he states that each party is in
the market when he contracts and the Section further
states this language :
''In making this contract of exchange, either
party may be mistaken in his estimate of market
7
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value, mistaken as to the appetite of others for
the commodity. He finds that he can not sell
for as much as he paid. Practically never is there
such a mistake as will justify recission. The
parties are conscious of the uncertainty of value.
Value is one of the principle subjects of agreement. Each party is consciously assuming the
risk of error of judgment. As to this, by business
custom, by prevailing mores, by social policy and
by existing law, the rule is caveat emptor. It is
also in equal degree, caveat emptor."
The Appellant's third statement of fact that at the
time the agreement was executed the stock had no value
is untrue in that the L.D.S. Church had been contacted
prior to the parties entering into the stock purchase
agreement and the Church was interested in the purchase of the assets of the Company up until the latter
part of February, 1962. At this time the Appellant
believed that each share of stock would have a value
of $70.00 after all of the Company's indebtedness had
been paid (Tr. 63).
The Appellant's fourth statement of facts that
the value of the stock could not be established by either
the Appellant or the Respondent at or prior to the
execution of the agreement is incorrect, in that the
accountant testified that the Company had indication
of a financial collapse between July, 1961 and January,
1962 ( Tr. 60). The accountant further stated in his
testimony that the value of the shares of stock could
have been determined in December of 1961 if a physical
inventory had been taken. During the aforesaid period
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the Appellant was working with the books of the Company every day and was also managing its operation.
The Appellant's sixth statement of facts that the
Appellant relied upon the same source of information
as the Respondent in fixing value is incorrect in that
the Appellant had been a salaried full time employee
with the Company as Comptroller for a period in excess
of five years prior to his entering into the agreement,
and he had also become the Secretary of the Company
(Tr. 20, 24). In the fall of 1961 the Respondent became
the acting Manager of the Company in addition to his
other duties. During this period the Respondent was
Vice President of the Company and played a very inactive role in that the Respondent's occupation was that
of a life insurance agent ( Tr. 4).
It is stated in 19 Am. J ur., Equity, Section 57:
"Where it appears that the parties to an instrument had equal knowledge or equal means
of obtaining knowledge of the facts, and no surprise or imposition is shown, the mistake is often
held to lay no foundation for equitable interference, being said to be strictly damnum absque
injuria." Belt v. Mehen, 2 Cal. 159, 56 Am. Dec.
329; Bibber v. Carville, 101 Me. 59, 63 A. 303,
115 Am. St. Rep. 303; McCobb v. Richardson,
24 Me. 82, 41 Am. Dec. 37 4.
The general law in this area is further stated in
19 Am. Jur., Equity, Section 58:
"In some circumstances relief will not be
granted upon a showing simply that the com-

9
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plainant, at the time of the disputed transaction,
was ignorant of, or mistaken as to, some matter
of fact; it must be made to appear that his ignorance was excusable. The conclusion is that he
is not entitled to relief where the evidence shows
that he was "negligent" or that he could and
would have ascertained the facts by the exercise
of "due" or "reasonable diligence", or where he
had "means of knowledge" or "might have ascertained the truth". In other words, mistake
to constitute equitable relief, must not be merely
the result of inattention, personal negligence or
misconduct on the party applying for relief.
The issue as to whether the complainant did or
did not exercise the requisite activity or diligence
is not to be determined, of course, with reference
to the facts and circumstances which attend the
transaction. Where the complainant's mistake
or ignorance of facts has brought about a legal
situation which must result in loss or prejudice
to one of the parties to the transaction, relief
will be denied if the evidence shows that they
were equally well situated to be informed as to
the facts."
There can be no doubt that the Appellant had
much more information in fixing the value of the shares
of stock than the Respondent. The applicable Utah
law is stated in White v. Snell, 35 Utah 434, 100 Pac.
927 (1909), wherein this Court said:
"But where the parties in entering into a contract stand upon an equality with respect to each
other and with regard to the subject matter of
the contract, courts ought not to interfere merely
because one side or other must assume or discharge a burden which was not anticipated when
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the contract was entered into, provided such a
burden comes within the terms of the contract.
If the business of the corporation had been
profitable during the duration of the agreement
in question, respondents no doubt would insist
upon the terms of the agreement, and their right
to have them enforced could not well be questioned so long as all of the stock holders receive
the proportional benefits to which they were
entitled. The mere fact that the enterprise resulted in a loss is no reason why a Court should
interfere."
The Appellant's seventh statement of facts that
there is no consideration for Appellant's promise to
pay, and for the payments actually made is incorrect
in that the Appellant was purchasing 64 shares of stock
that had value at the time of entering into the agreement. These shares had value up until February, 1962
when the L.D.S. Church indicated they may buy all
of the assets of the Company.
The Appellant is asking for the rescission of the
stock purchase agreement based upon equitable doctrines and in seeking rescission the complainant must
act timely. The Appellant did not initiate an action for
rescission when he learned of the financial collapse of
the Company in the latter part of January, 1962. He
elected to continue to make his monthly payments with
the knowledge that the L.D.S. Church was interested
in purchasing the assets of the Company and the possibility he could realize a handsome profit from the
stock purchase agreement.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits his case on the facts in this
case as disclosed by the record and the law applicable
to the issues of this case.
Respectfully submitted,

BRIDWELL & FRANDSEN
By Alan D. Frandsen
Attorneys for Respondent
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